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Admiral Bull Halsey himself broke a stern War College edict — the one against committing capital ships in restricted waters. Gambling the future of the cut-off troops on Guadalcanal on one final roll of the dice, Halsey dispatched into the Slot his two remaining fast battleships, the USS South Dakota and the USS Washington, escorted by the only four destroyers with enough fuel in their bunkers to get them there and back.

In command of the 28-knot battlewagons was the right man at the right pla4ce, gunnery expert Rear Adm. Willis A. “Ching Chong China” Lee. Lee’s flag flew aboard the Washington, in turn commanded by Captain Glenn Davis.

Lee was a nut for gunnery drills. “He tested every gunnery-book rule with exercises,” Lippman writes, “and ordered gunnery drills under odd conditions — turret firing with relief crews, anything that might simulate the freakishness of battle.”

As it turned out, the American destroyers need not have worried about carrying enough fuel to get home. By 11 p.m. on Nov. 13, outnumbered better than three-to-one by a massive Japanese task force driving down from the northwest, every one of the four American destroyers had been shot up, sunk, or set aflame, while the South Dakota — known throughout the fleet as a jinx ship — managed to damage some lesser Japanese vessels but continued to be plagued with electrical and fire control problems.

“Washington was now the only intact ship left in the force,” Lippman writes. “In fact, at that moment Washington was the entire U.S. Pacific Fleet. She was the only barrier between (Admiral) Kondo’s ships and Guadalcanal. If this one ship did not stop 14 Japanese ships right then and there, America might lose the war. ...

On Washington’s bridge, Lieutenant Ray Hunter still had the conn. He had just heard that South Dakota had gone off the air and had seen (destroyers) Walke and Preston “blow sky high.” Dead ahead lay their burning wreckage, while hundreds of men were swimming in the water and Japanese ships were racing in.

“Hunter had to do something. The course he took now could decide the war. ‘Come left,’ he said, and Washington straightened out on a course parallel to the one on which she (had been) steaming. Washington’s rudder change put the burning destroyers between her and the enemy, preventing her from being silhouetted by their fires.

“The move made the Japanese momentarily cease fire. Lacking radar, they could not spot Washington behind the fires. ...

“Meanwhile, Washington raced through burning seas. Everyone could see dozens of men in the water clinging to floating wreckage. Flag Lieutenant Raymond Thompson said, “Seeing that burning, sinking ship as it passed so close aboard, and realizing that there was nothing I, or anyone, could do about it, was a devastating experience.’

“Commander Ayrault, Washington’s executive officer, clambered down ladders, ran to Bart Stoodley’s damage-control post, and ordered Stoodley to cut loose life rafts. That saved a lot of lives. But the men in the water had some fight left in them. One was heard to scream, ‘Get after them, Washington!’ ”

Sacrificing their ships by maneuvering into the path of torpedoes intended for the Washington, the captains of the American destroyers had given China Lee one final chance. The Washington was fast, undamaged, and bristling with 16-inch guns. And, thanks to Lt. Hunter’s course change, she was also now invisible to the enemy.

Blinded by the smoke and flames, the Japanese battleship Kirishima turned on her searchlights, illuminating the helpless South Dakota, and opened fire. Finally, standing out in the darkness, Lee and Davis could positively identify an enemy target.

The Washington’s main batteries opened fire at 12 midnight precisely. Her new SG radar fire control system worked perfectly. Between midnight and 12:07 a.m., Nov. 14, the “last ship in the U.S. Pacific Fleet” stunned the battleship Kirishima with 75, 16-inch shells. For those aboard the Kirishima, it rained steel.

In seven minutes, the Japanese battleship was reduced to a funeral pyre. She went down at 3:25 a.m., the first enemy sunk by an American battleship since the Spanish-American War. Stunned, the remaining Japanese ships withdrew. Within days, Yamamoto and his staff reviewed their mounting losses and recommended the unthinkable to the emperor — withdrawal from Guadalcanal.

But who remembers, today, how close-run a thing it was — the ridge held by a single Marine, the battle won by the last American ship?

In the autumn of 1942.

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"Stand Aside. This is Ching!"

2007 Admiral Lee Memorial Speech delivered recently to the United States Naval Academy Rifle Team by Floyd Houston, USMC (ret.) at Lee’s graveside.

Please stand at ease…
• “Four years together by the bay,
where Severn joins the tide.
• Then by the service called away
we’re scattered far and wide.
• But still when two or three shall meet
and old tales be retold –
• from low to highest in the Fleet
we’ll pledge the Blue and Gold.”

You all recognize this refrain from our alma matter. In three weeks I’ll be getting together with my classmates to celebrate our 30th. This refrain hits the nail squarely on the head in terms of what will be happening there.

One enduring lesson I’ve learned is that leadership should never be confused with being appointed to any particular position. In my opinion Webster’s incorrectly lists leadership as a noun. It’s not – its really a verb. Leadership is an action involving three parts, each of which we pray our appointed leaders, especially in wartime, are capable. One, Leaders simply do the right thing. Two, they do it for the right reasons. Three, and most importantly, they do it at the right times.

What is the “right thing?” What are the right reasons? How do you tell when it is the right time? With any luck, we’ll cover some of that today.

Our vehicle is an old tale that requires re-telling – honoring the career of a man named Willis Augustus Lee, Jr. Although Lee was a Midshipman one hundred years ago, his exploits still serve as an inspiration. We have a direct connection to him and he to us – through his lifetime of leadership.

Born 11 May 1888, Willis Lee grew up in Owenton, Kentucky and his family was related to the Lees of Virginia. He was appointed to the US Naval Academy in 1904 at the age of 16, and already had a reputation as a good shot at the time he entered the academy. He was a star athlete on the Rifle Team. He prepared himself so thoroughly as an athlete that when given the opportunity to participate in the US National Rifle and Pistol Championships one hundred years ago in 1907, he became the only American ever to win both the US National High Power Rifle and Pistol Championships in the same year and he did it with a borrowed pistol! He did the right thing in preparing himself mentally and physically for high-level competition. He did it for the right reasons – because he was a Naval Academy Team shooter and his individual scores added to or detracted from his team’s performance. His timing was impeccable as he peaked at the National Championships. He also lived a life like most Midshipmen, being noted for drawing cartoons for the LUCKY BAG, getting put on report, and eventually graduating in the middle of his class in June 1908.

Lee was known throughout his life for his self-confidence, his analytical ability, his genuine modesty, for the twinkle in his eye, a wry sense of humor, and his kindness to subordinates. He was never known to brag of his own exploits, although he could have told some amazing sea stories…

For example, in April 1914 the whole world was in turmoil and World War One was about to break out. The Navy and Marine Corps were ordered to occupy Vera Cruz, Mexico to improve the stability of the government. As a Company Commander of the battleship New Hampshire’s landing force, his men took fire. He borrowed a rifle, dialed in his long range zero, assumed a textbook sitting position out in the open, drew fire as was necessary to locate the muzzle flashes from rooftops further inland, and dispatched three of the snipers at long range.
It sort of gives new meaning to a finals competition or a “guts match” doesn’t it?

During the summer of 1920, then LCDR Lee was a member of the U.S. Olympic rifle team that competed in Antwerp, Belgium. He was the high medal winner of those games, taking home five gold medals, one silver medal, and one bronze medal – an accomplishment that made him the Michael Phelps of his time. Being an intense competitor in high-level competition has crossover value as you live out your lives of leadership and service. By that I mean specifically that as pilots, during emergencies, you will react exactly as well as you trained, a “man overboard” on your bridge watch will go as smoothly as you’ve mastered the “man overboard drill”, and ground combat goes exactly as well as you’ve trained. There are no nerves, no second thoughts, it just happens EXACTLY as well as you’ve trained beforehand. All of you will experience this. Most of you will agree with me later. Some of you, the unlucky or the ones who didn’t put in the training will die and worse yet, you will probably take good folks with you.

Olympic fame notwithstanding, Admiral Lee was expected to serve with the fleet and serve he did. He sailed on the cruiser New Orleans, the gunboat Helena, the battleship Idaho twice, and the battleship New Hampshire. He also served on the destroyers O’Brien and Lea, and tender Anteres.

He did shore tours when assigned, even though he preferred sea duty, and met his wife Mabelle of Rock Island, Illinois during one such tour.

He was XO of the tender Bushnell and the battleship Pennsylvania. He commanded the destroyers Lardner and Preston, the cruiser Concord, and was widely regarded as an expert in ship handling, gunnery, and surface tactics. Just prior to the war he was assigned as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Fleet Readiness. In this position he immersed himself in learning and applying radar technology. He would later use that self training in high stakes combat.

Early in World War Two, he commanded Battleship Division 6, with his flag onboard the battleship Washington. He was a senior leader for America’s greatest generation as they left the farms, factories, and schoolhouses of this great nation to go out and save the world.

By mid-November 1942, the situation in the Solomon Islands was critical. The Japanese had swept virtually undefeated across the Pacific. The Americans, who had hastily landed the 1st Marine Division on the strategic Island of Guadalcanal in August, were now down to one aircraft carrier—Enterprise—after the loss of Wasp in September and Hornet in October. Japanese surface units were subjecting the Marines’ on Guadalcanal to heavy bombardments while landing supplies and reinforcements with disturbing regularity. The Japanese, based on their mastery of night surface gunnery and their superb torpedoes, tended to make their moves at night, while Allied planes controlled the local skies during the day. Night naval combat off Guadalcanal was a disaster for the US. Efforts to halt the Tokyo Express cost so many US ships that the offshore waters became known as Iron Bottom Sound. In fact, the very night before Admiral Lee was sent into the breech, two Navy flag officers along with 700 of their men perished in combat there.

The situation boiled to a crisis as Japanese Admiral Kondo led the Tokyo Express with his flag on the battleship Kirishima, escorting a convoy of 8,000 fresh troops with orders to land and wipe out the beleaguered US Marines ashore, sink any remaining American Naval Vessels, bomb the Marine airstrip off the face of the map, and return north by early morning on 15 November. In addition to the battleship Kirishima, he had two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and six destroyers all of whom had steamed and fought and triumphed together as a well-oiled team.

Unwilling to risk his only remaining carrier, Admiral Halsey, played his last trump card, two fast battleships located 300 miles south of Guadalcanal under Willis Lee. In contrast to Admiral Kondo, Halsey ordered Lee to command a pick-up team, warning him to be ready for a flank-speed run north to Guadalcanal. The brand new fast battleship South Dakota was fresh from the shipyard and not fully prepared. Of the four US destroyers that were selected as escorts for the two battleships, none had ever operated together before as a team. They were chosen simply because they had the most remaining fuel in their tanks. All were of different classes and from different divisions. On the battleship Washington, however, Lee had the advantage of having trained this ship and this crew since the early in the war – just the sort of training top rifle competitors conduct to prepare for high-level competitions – what if’s, tactics, gun drills, aiming practice, new radar-directed firing, and lots of target practice. As Lee’s ships sped through the dark waters of Iron-bottom Sound, his radio operators heard American radio traffic. PT-boats were reporting Lee’s moves in plain English and they swung in to attack– thinking Lee’s ships were more Japanese. Using his Naval Academy nickname to identify himself, he personally radioed to the PT boats and to General Vandegrift ashore, “Stand aside, this is Ching Lee, I’m coming through.”

Just before midnight the actual American and Japanese forces DID engage, destroyers first – and sadly, as is oft the case with pick-up teams, they lacked night training and cohesion. Destroyer Preston sunk quickly at 2336. Destroyer Gwin was hit at about the same time Preston went down. At 2338, the destroyer Walke took a torpedo in her magazine, killing close to a hundred. Another torpedo blasted off the destroyer Benham’s bow. All four of Lee’s destroyers were now out of the fight. He was down to his battleships. Washington found the Japanese destroyer Ayanami and sunk her. Then, at very the height of the pitched fight, the new battleship South Dakota lost electrical power. Inadequate pre-combat engineering training was the likely culprit. None-the-less, radar, fire control, turret motors, ammunition hoists, radios—everything went out. Admiral Lee’s Battleship Washington was now the only intact ship left in the force. In fact, at that moment, Washington was the entire U.S. Pacific Fleet. She was the only barrier between Kondo’s ships and Guadalcanal. If this one ship did not stop 14 Japanese ships right then and there, America might lose the war.

Lee turned Washington so the burning destroyers were between himself and the Japanese, effectively negating the superior Japanese night optics and torpedoes. As he sailed by, they cut free life rafts on Washington’s starboard side – there were literally hundreds of men in the water. Washington crewmen reported hearing cheers from the survivors in the oily water urging Washington forward. At this point Kirishima flashed its spotlight to target the helpless South Dakota and in so doing, revealed herself briefly to the absolute master of guts matches, Willis Lee. The Japanese ship was 8,400 yards away on the starboard beam. Kirishima and Washington exchanged fire. The men who trained and fought under Olympic champion Willis A. Lee later said, “Fire control and battery functioned as smoothly as though she [we] were engaged in a well-rehearsed target practice.” In short order nine 16-inch and forty 5-inch rounds struck Kirishima. The ship sank shortly after. Admiral Kondo, stunned, turned his still superior force around. Lee backed Washington off slightly, hoping to keep Kondo literally in the dark about the fact that only Washington remained. As dawn broke, US aviation wiped out the transports and most of the ground reinforcements. Lee’s audacity and Washington’s performance under his leadership had prevailed against all odds. FDR proclaimed it one of the great naval battles of the war. The truth of the matter was that Lee won that fight during pre-combat training both of himself and of Washington.

For his actions that night, Olympic Champion Willis A. Lee was decorated with this nation’s second highest award for valor – the Navy Cross. Tragically, Admiral Lee died of a heart attack shortly after VJ Day. At his funeral right here on this very spot in 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal called Lee “the savior of Guadalcanal.” How do you learn how to perform leadership under such pressure?

It starts in the crucible of Bancroft Hall. It is hardened in the discipline necessary to make this team, to perform in intercollegiate and national competition. It is flexed in odd places from the bridges of ships to urban combat while young. It is polished in Olympic competition and tested in life and death struggle in positions of great responsibility.

Just like Lee in 1904, you have accepted an appointment in the US Naval Service as a Midshipman. It’s a noun – a name implying leadership. Leadership, as exercised by Willis Lee was a series of actions he executed regularly throughout a long career – doing the right things, for the right reasons, at the right times. When you execute your daily schedule, is leadership an action YOU perform regularly through attention to detail, dedication to your team, through living an honest, decent, and humble life? Or like some, do you glide along pulling your oar only just hard enough to get by? Each of us visualize ourselves like Admiral Lee here with National Championship titles, Olympic medals, and battlefield prowess, but what are you doing every day to prepare yourself for the high stakes competitions which are sure to come? I invite each and every one of you here today to look at this grave, know that you are standing on the shoulders of the giants, and to dedicate yourselves to a life that is worthy of it.

Thank you.

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BTW, in recent years the official records of the IJN and IJA have finally been released and this information has greatly expanded the knowledge base of information related to the Guadalcanal campaign, on land, in the air and at sea.

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Originally posted by LionHunter:
"...ascribed the retirement to a shortage of fuel in a message to Nimitz on August 9 and the impression stuck in some quarters that low oil bunkers represented the sole, or primary, reason for Fletcher's conduct. This interpretation became a tool to further taint Fletcher's decision, as it later emerged that the carrier groups possessed sufficient fuel to operate for several more days.*"

"* The Naval War College Analysis shows that Fletcher's destroyers were 75% full in TG 61.1.1 (the SARATOGA Group), approximately 42% full in TG 61.1.2 (the ENTERPRISE Group) and 44% full in TG 61.1.3 (the WASP Group). The cruisers were all 50% or more full and the carriers remained in good shape with the lowest, ENTERPRISE, with fuel for three more days of operations."

Hope you find this helpful. You seem to indicate that you relied on single source documents and I would suggest that is an impossible way to understand the battle as a whole. While I read single sources such as those by Eugene Levie, who were there, you must take caution and understand that they can only speak to that which occurred to them personally or under their control. While this works OK when discussing what one ship did in a sea battle or what one machine gun team did in a specific fire fight and reaches close to perfection in a pilot description of a dogfight, there was always more involved.

quote:

Originally posted by LionHunter:
CFS,

You are refusing to address the points I make and provide documentation of, with appropriate citation, including U.S. Naval War College Analysis. Regardless, you continue to insist Fletcher was not at fault, even though as the Expeditionary Force commander his unilateral decision to withdraw the carriers led to the change in Allied fortunes on Guadalcanal.

We can't discuss this if you insist on approaching the discussion as a one way street, going your way. You know as well as I that the U.S. Navy deserted their post and failed to complete their mission. Whatever happened after that doesn't change that fact and no amount of obfuscation will change those facts.

Consequently I will simply say that I believe, based upon training, education, research and experience, that you are wrong, and leave it at that. Do yourself a favor and read the book I cited, you might learn something.

Semper Fi

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An abundance of new evidence demanded this reevaluation of Frank Jack Fletcher, the "black shoe" admiral who won his battles at sea but lost the war of public opinion. A surface warrior—in contrast to a "brown shoe" naval aviator—Fletcher led the carrier forces that won against all odds at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons. These and other early carrier victories decided the Pacific War not only because they inflicted crippling losses but also because they denied Japan key strategic positions in the region. Despite these successes, by 1950 Fletcher had become one of the most controversial figures in U.S. naval history and was portrayed as a timid bungler who failed to relieve Wake Island in December 1941 and who deliberately abandoned the Marines at Guadalcanal.

In this book, author John Lundstrom recalls that Fletcher once remarked,"after an action is over, people talk a lot about how the decisions were deliberately reached, but actually there's always a hell of a lot of groping around," and notes that the goal of his study is to probe and explain the "groping around." Drawing on new material, Lundstrom offers a fresh look at Fletcher's decisions and actions. The first major reassessment in more than fifty years of the once-maligned naval officer, it provides a careful analysis of the effect of radio intelligence on decision-making in the carrier battles during the first nine months of the war in the Pacific. This new assessment is based on thousands of documents and massive dispatch files and personal papers that no historian has previously used.

quote:

The Battle of Guadalcanal marked the first offensive ground operations conducted in the Pacific theater during World War II. One divisive issue of the Guadalcanal campaign is the withdrawal of carrier based aviation support on 8 August 1942, by Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. The historical record is dominated by the argument that Fletcher faced very little threat and could have supported the invasion forces longer than he did. What influenced Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to withdraw carrier based aviation from direct support of the Guadalcanal invasion and was the decision valid? In order to objectively evaluate Fletcher's decision, this paper will first review historical literature and outline how the dominate opinion of Fletcher's decision developed. Next, it will look at Fletcher's character, development as a leader, and record from commissioning through the Watchtower campaign. This study will also review of the orders and guidance at the strategic level and the operations of subordinate commanders within Watchtower. Finally, the metrics of 1942 and the modern strategic military decision-making model will be applied to evaluate the validity of the decision to withdraw. The evidence clearly suggests that Fletcher's decision was strategically valid, in addition to being characterized inaccurately by historians.

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The spokesman for the traditionalist school, Samuel Eliot Morison, states in his history, The Two Ocean War that the “main factor” in the successful defense of Guadalcanal “was the Marines. When the transports and surviving naval vessels departed on 9 August, they had landed over 16,000 Marines, but less than half their supplies and weapons had been unloaded. The Leathernecks pulled in their belts and lived on two meals a day, using the large stores of rice which the Japanese had obligingly left; but they could not continue to fight without naval support-witness what had happened at Wake.” Morison barely mentions the other facets of a successful amphibious operation: the control of the sea and air around the objective. Unlike Wake, Guadalcanal was a strategic position essential to operations in the South Pacific. The brave Marines ashore on Guadalcanal were fighting with the support of the Navy--three fully operational flat tops with courageous Naval Aviators struggling to wrest control of the oceans from a numerically superior enemy. They also unknowingly enjoyed the support of brave surface warriors and submariners who paid a terrible price in the waters around Guadalcanal. The Marines ashore had difficulty seeing these warriors, because they operated over the horizon. Unfortunately, readers of history have also been unable to see these facts for the last sixty years because of the tactical and literary prism through which the carrier withdrawal on 8 August 1942 has been characterized.

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John Lundstrom delivers much more in this book than the long overdue resurrection of the reputation of Frank Jack Fletcher. These riveting pages provide for the first time the unvarnished full story of the U.S. Navy's leadership in the first critical year of the Pacific War. With meticulous research and penetrating insigh, Lundstrom overthrows all previous accounts from the strategic to the operational level. Nor is the human factor slighted. This stellar work is alive with the vision, the blindness, the loyalties, and the betrayals of this colorful cast. It is impossible to overstate the importance of this work for understanding the Pacific War.

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Written the evening of 8 August 1942, Maas's invaluable explication of the reasons behind the recommendation to retire the carriers coincides closely with Fletcher's recollections years later to Baldwin and Dyer. As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Maas strongly supported Fletcher's action by laying out all of the relevant factors of necessity, security and supply: "To stay meant fighter protection for landing force and for finishing unloading cargo ships. Daily bombing attacks from Rabaul. To leave means leaving Marines without fighter protection. To stay means endangering the carriers. We have too few to risk them at his time. The task forces need fuel. Attrition is rapidly reducing fighter strength of the carriers. In addition to increasing danger from shore-based attack, every hour increases the danger from Jap subs, now gathering and heading for us."

... Maas undestood the "Marines cannot be dislodged by bombers. They will take a drubbing, and their losses will be greater without carriers." However, the best chance of destroying the landing force was "by an expedition similar to ours."

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He outlined Fletcher's plan of action. "To be able to intercept (and) defeat such an effort, our carrier task forces must be fueled and awy so as not to be trapped here."

... Maas explained on 8 August "By withdrawing to, say, Noumea, or Tongatabu, we will be in a position to intercept and pull a second Midway on their carriers. If, however, we stay on here and then, getting very low on fuel, withdraw to meet our tankers, and if they should be torpedoed, our whole fleet will caught helpless and would be cold meat for the Japs, with the resultant loss of our fleet, 2/3 of our carriers, and we would lose Tulagi as well, with all the Marines there, and perhaps all the transports." Maas then placed the withdrawal of the carriers in a wider context. "It is true, Marines will take a pounding until their own air gets established (about 10 days or so). But they can dig in, hole up, and wait. Extra losses are a localized operation. This is balanced against a potential National tragedy. Loss of our fleet or one or more of these carriers is a real, worldwide tragedy." To put it bluntly, was the risk of having one or more carriers possibly crippled or sunk worth staying to protect the five cargo ships that Fletcher thought would remain off Lunga? Maas thought no. A proud Marine, Maas could hardly be accused of bing unsympathetic to the Corps. Pederson in his 1944 lecture completely agreed with his colleague. "The correctness of the decision to withdraw the carriers is one that is still in dispute. When viewed from the viewpoint of the marines ashore it was questionable. But when looked at the broader strategic picture it has proved correct."

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Originally posted by Edmond:
Very interesting thread, I did not know much of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and this turning point in the Pacific Theater of Operation.

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Originally posted by Rub Line:
I was at Guadalcanal for the 50th. Too bad the USN did a piss poor job of educating us about the actual events that took place there.

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Originally posted by LionHunter:
Revisionist history. Fletcher infatuation. Failure to consider his own fallibility. Refusal to respect the opinions/research of anyone but himself because they are all "...a bunch of pricks whose egos won't let them admit they're fallible."

China Fleet Sailor has become quite the expert on all things Guadalcanal. Boring!

quote:

Originally posted by LionHunter:
So, now you claim it is a myth that the U.S. Navy up-anchored and sailed away on August 9, 1942, without completing its' mission to land the landing force? Even the official history of the U.S. Navy knows that is fact. And included in those ships that sailed away were almost all rations, more than 1/2 the units of fire (ammunition for you navy types), and more than a full battalion of Marines as well as virtually all heavy equipment intended to complete the airfield.

The U.S. Navy does not deny any of that, yet you, in your wisdom, want to make excuses for these actions and try to shift the issue to what Fletcher did before and after.

I don't pretend shit and resent your silly insinuation that anything I have said is a myth or that what senior Marines who were, unlike you, deserted by the U.S. Navy on Guadalcanal, may have related to me personally when I served in the Corps with veterans from that campaign.

You are not the only one who has done research and has the university degrees to support it. So get over yourself and your dislike of Marines. The facts of history are not revisable just because they don't fit your ideal of a Navy unable to make mistakes.

And gee, thanks for your permission to think what I like, but I didn't ask for it and don't require it.

And in conclusion, here's what I think about your position. It's clear to me that you have no intention of admitting the facts as I've stated them and will continue with your apologist attitude for what the Navy did, or more correctly failed to do, so there is no reason for further discussion.

SEMPER FI

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Originally posted by LionHunter:
Frank spent ten years writing this account which includes first time translations of Japanese Defense Agency official accounts and declassified U.S. radio intelligence. He covers the battle on land, at sea and in the air.

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"* The Naval War College Analysis shows that Fletcher's destroyers were 75% full in TG 61.1.1 (the SARATOGA Group), approximately 42% full in TG 61.1.2 (the ENTERPRISE Group) and 44% full in TG 61.1.3 (the WASP Group). The cruisers were all 50% or more full and the carriers remained in good shape with the lowest, ENTERPRISE, with fuel for three more days of operations."

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Originally posted by Edmond:
Very interesting thread again.

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Originally posted by Flags:
Hey CFS

Ignore Lionhunter. Like most Jarheads he cant get past the virtual brainwashing that the Corps puts in them.

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Originally posted by Idaho Sharpshooter:
The incredible camaraderie between the service branches is still music to my ears.

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Originally posted by Whitworth:
As a former Marine, I can't say that I don't feel like squids are cousins to us jarheads. That said, we do need a ride into battle.....

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Originally posted by China Fleet Sailor:Marines. It's like having a wife who can't cook or do laundry.

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merrills rangers

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Merrill’s Marauders or Unit Galahad, officially named the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional), was a United States long range penetration special operations unit in the South-East Asian Theater of World War II which fought in the Burma Campaign. The unit became famous for its deep-penetration missions behind Japanese lines, often engaging Japanese forces superior in number.