This is a HIGH PUCKER FACTOR FLIGHT from the past, a friend just sent it to me....thought you would enjoy this well written roller coaster story with a good ending.

ENJOY!!


When you think every thing is going just fine....get ready...


It was supposed to be a routine logistical flight.

Our six crew members included an active-duty Marine test pilot, four aircrew from Air
Test and Evaluation Squadron VX-20, plus an FAA Flight Test Engineer.

The four engine C-130 ' Herc's ' passengers included four maintenance people and a
Navy active-duty maintainer. We also carried various maintenance ' pack-up ' items plus
ends and odds of baggage.

Our mission was to reposition a Hercules KC-130T, to the expeditionary airfield at Twenty Nine Palms for electronic-propeller-control system testing in the field.

We had flown this C-130 Hercules through every imaginable test configuration at NAS Pax River. All that remained was to evaluate system performance at low-level. For several days, we would fly low altitude missions in the desert . . before returning the ' Herc ' to its parent unit.

About an hour or so after take-off, we were settled into a routine flight at 24M on auto-pilot. I was in the right seat and just had gotten into a comfortable position for my rear
end . . when the aircraft suddenly . . pitched up.

Hard. And simultaneously.

It rolled left.

The Aircraft Commander and I were mentally triggered to lurch forward with emergency
' hardness ' to punch our autopilot-disconnects. In error, we both thought that a crippled
. . failed autopilot ' system had gifted ' us the pitch-up . . along with that severe wing drop.

To our further alarm, the C-130 continued its hard G pitch-up and its ' weird ' aileron pressure . .

On its own ! (PHOTOGRAPH- INVERTED C-130)


The huge airplane continued harshly rotating to the left.

Both of our hands and feet were on the controls . . to strongly oppose the control
moves. But unnatural forces overwhelmed . . our combined strength.

And when the wings showed rotation beyond the gauges vertical . . our Herc's
left cockpit windows were slicing down through . . both gages' artificial horizons.

In a rolling . . inverted dive . . we zoomed lower into the solid IFR ' goop.'

The left seater yelled : " M-Y A-I-R-P-L-A-N-E ! "

After a short argument in my brain . . I yielded my dual yoke control.

But my giving up the yoke . . was a totally disciplined effort.

Up front . . all of the cockpit crew and FAA guy, watched helplessly as the four-engine C-130 . . rolled completely over . . on to its back.

Its hull still rotating, we watched her fling herself almost straight down . . and picking up speed.

As the Herc lunged into an accelerating spinning dive to its . . my aircraft attitude gyro
was now ' fully displaying its never before seen . . brown- colored reverse side '
. . before it began fast rotating . . like a child's toy top.

Our specialized world became . . violent when the NEGATIVE G's caught the airplane in
its ' fist.'

Our flight engineer . . weirdly waving his arms and legs . . was pinned . . to the cockpit's ceiling. At the wrong time, he'd un-buckled his seat belt . . and he had been ' leaning far forward ' to tweak an engine's fuel.

During our second diving rotation, we ' roller coastered ' into NEGATIVE G's and a ' dust devil ' of helmet bags, IFR approach plates, papers, coffee, dirt, dislodged knobs, were joined with a odd flight of a SUBWAY brand sandwich . . floating like a towed ad banner past my
side vision.

Back behind our cockpit . . in our passenger/cargo area . . pandemonium reigned. Almost no one had their seat belt on.

Not even loosely in place.

Inputted with intense fear of the unknown, all of the passengers had been bodily tossed
to the ceiling . . trashing each other around . . within a swirling storm of dirt and stuff the multi-engine's cargo bay had accumulated . . during its entire service life.

As the many-engine aircraft flew on . . out of control . . I looked over to glimpse at the
left seater's attitude indicator. IT WAS NOT MATCHING MY OWN . .


In fact, his attitude indicator had tumbled its ' gyro '. . it was flipping strangely . . just ratcheting around . . distracting us . . worse than worthless.

Both airspeed indicators were approaching 350 knots as the Commander struggled to
raise the Herc's nose.

After glancing at our increasing airspeed, I knew all four [ 4 ] the throttles were . . still
at . . cruise power.

Without my asking the A/C's permission . . using both hands . . I yanked all four [ 4 ] throttle levers . . back to idle power.

As our airspeed began to decay, I checked my turn and bank indicator.

W-O-W !

Its uncoordinated ball was max'd way over into its glass tube's right corner.

And next to ball's tube . . its turn needle was max'd . . the opposite direction.

I yelled : " HEY . . I THINK WE ARE IN SOME KIND OF A SPIN ! "

My shout shifted the Aircraft Commander's eye balls to his own turn and bank. He quickly reacted . . as we entered a third rotation.

The A/C 's foot kicked full rudder in the ball's opposite direction . . and stopped the roll.

But now . . unbelievably quick . . the airspeed built up toward ' max ' red line . . showing
us we must be pointed close to straight down.

As his attitude gyro was uselessly flipping around, the left seater focused on his rate of descent instrument and the whirling altimeter . . trying to perceive . . up from down.

While trying to strong arm the ' Herc's 'nose up where it belonged, I became aware of
an incredible whining sound.

It was previously unnoticed . . because both of us had been shouting with alarm . . the propellor on # 3 engine was reading . . 106% overspeed.

Still in dense cloud all around, we finally got the wings level at 5,000 feet. We declared
an emergency to to Indianapolis Center . . requesting a vector to the nearest long fat run-way.

And allow us to descend out of the IFR ' goop. '

Still uncertain why the aircraft departed controlled flight, we ordered the crew to check
on passenger injuries. Then began assessing what had caused our odd-ball emergency.

We told our flight engineer to carefully head aft with our injured loadmaster who'd been untangled from the stack of human bodies . . that were tossed here and there.

Fortunately, the loadmaster just had a moderate head wound, broken bones, and moderate gashes.

When we descended out of instrument weather IFR ' goop ' . . and got our first visual ground reference since the emergency. Then we got a ' visual ' on the emergency airport . . Indianapolis Control had moved us toward.

Simultaneously, some crew member or passenger came on the ' Herc's Intercom radio . . shouting :

' FIRE ! '

We scanned our instruments, nacelles, wings and everything visible to check for a fire.
But there was nothing we could see . . or find.

With no time to look any further, we told Indy Center the aircraft might on fire . . and
now required an immediate landing.

Surveying the Herc's interior, it looked like a bomb had gone off. With assorted human beings and debris strewn all over the cargo area. Up front, our flight deck was piled with everything your brain can conceive.

Or not.

Including a set of wheel chocks that zero gravity had migrated forward through our
cargo compartment's wide open door.

Turning on final approach, we'd no approach plates, or checklists. Our navigator was frantically digging and grabbing through the cockpit jumble to find the detail we needed.

Once we got our hands on West Virginia's Huntington IFR plate detail, we made a normal recovery and a fair landing.

Because we feared fire somewhere onboard . . we got on the brakes and quickly cleared
the runway . . shutdown=set brakes=gathered our injured=and evacuated.

No fire.

So we returned to the aircraft . . trying to discover . . what caused our life-threatening odyssey.

Rammed into the ' Hercs 'tail feathers . . was a twenty [20 ] man rubber life raft.

It had deployed in-flight from its wing-storage arrangement. It was still inflated . .
and was wrapped around our left horizontal stabilizer's leading edge.

In flight, both life rafts had deployed. One vanished. Bu the other had wrapped itself around the horizontal stabilizer . . then in a nano-second it had levered the ' Herky's '
entire elevator control surface.

Full up.

We had ( 1 ) rolled upside down at least twice, ( 2 ) lost 9,000 feet of altitude, ( 3 ) ex-
ceeded the three positive and 2 negative G's limits. And ( 5 ) the airspeed had ' nicked '
485 knots.

The data pallet [ brought along along to record flight-test data] captured invaluable performance data and allowed us to reconstruct our flight profile.

After extensive inspections and repairs, we flew our aircraft home.

Reflecting on this harrowing experience, I'm reminded of our good fortune in having a truly professional air crew, engaged in the important work of testing Navy-aircraft systems.

We not only survived a catastrophic malfunction, but we maintained our resilient sense
of humor . . as attested by the four-leaf clover, that still ' nests ' in my flight suit.

Later, a crew member found some money lying on the ground. And we all had a good
laugh when one of our group said : " This must be our lucky day."

Dan Sanders is a retired Marine Corps major, employed as a contract pilot with VX-20.

And the analyst further gave a further ' heads up ' : No pilot's completely immune to
the ' Blue Threat ' of significant equipment failure.

In this instance, our cockpit was chock full of flying experience and expertise. This air-crew did an outstanding job recovering after an un-commanded deployment of two life rafts attached under the C130's right wing.

One lesson worth repeating is = every time you are flying, stay strapped . . unless you
have a need to move about the aircraft. In this case, it would have prevented multiple injuries among both crew and passengers.

The second ' Blue Threat ' was when our aircrew did not adequately recognize . . then attempt to mitigate . . the existing known hazard of uncommanded deployment of both
life rafts from C-130 aircraft's wing.

There had been ( 6 ) six documented similar instances in the Hercules C-130. Effective safety processes must be promulgated and ' robust ' enough to compel recognition and comprehension of the risks of . . known operational hazards.


--Cdr. John Morrison, C-130 analyst, Naval Safety Center
and Dan Sanders Approach September - October 2006 [ abridged ]

What a great read! Thanks Eddy.