Previously posted in the political section.

Highest rating: 5 Stars

This book, approximately 465 pages, is a must read for those who have any interests in the basic causes and miscalculations which got us to the present situation in Iraq. It begins with a brief history and explores the principal actors leading up to the rush to war. Then goes on thru the invasion and on to the present, sometimes in excruciating detail. Rather than try to do a detailed review, which would be too long, I'll give a few impressions which have stuck or struck me from my reading of this book. It is well written and entertaining considering the details that had to be covered.

First, I was really amazed to find out how much of this war was the result of one man's obsession, specifically Paul Wolfowitz. Of course, he had to convince Cheney via Libby and Rumsfeld, et all but once Cheney fell in line, it was a done deal. There is a very brief passing reference to the fact that Cheney basically did a 180 on his views of nation building especially as it relates to Iraq and he posits that it could possibly be as a result of his heart problems and medication. I've actually seen this in real life with a friend of mine, now deceased, who commented that certain of his heart meds made him feel extremely belligerent.

Much of what is said in the book has been covered in many places but Ricks brings it together in a very concise form. The endemic Bush Whitehouse and military optimism and the failure to punish those whose screw ups caused the present mess is well covered.

Interestingly, Ricks, both in this book and in interviews I've seen relating to it, puts much of the blame on Congress for failing to do its oversight job before rubber stamping an invasion on very shaky grounds. While he doesn't say it in exactly these words, the timing of the war resolution just before the elections and the fears of the incumbents of appearing "soft" on terrorism was a major factor.

I was also amazed to learn how VERY CLOSE the US and our troops were to winning a peace IF they had had a good strategy and enough boots on the ground. They didn't have either one. The much covered General Shinseki comments were dead on, as it turns out. Therefore, instead of going forward, we actually went backwards through most of 2003, 04 and 05. We may have changed the strategy now, but it is probably too little, too late.

For those who know such things this is old hat, but strategy and tactics, militarily speaking are not the same, nor are the words interchangeable as they are often used by the uninformed. Essentially there was no strategy for Phase IV (the post invasion victory phase) of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Very simply, Strategy is what you ultimately want to accomplish, a goal. Tactics are what get you to your strategic goal. As they said in the book, if your strategy is wrong, then the tactics don't matter but if you have the right strategy then you can adjust your tactics, however wrong they might start out, to achieve your goals. Unfortunately for the US, Iraq, and now possibly the larger Middle East, there was no discernable strategy, either political or militarily speaking for Phase IV.

I'm not going to bother to look this up in the book, but this point was illustrated by one US Officer talking to one of the Vietnamese Generals a few years back saying something to the effect, "But you never beat us in a battle." And the Vietnamese replied, "That may be so, but that is irrelevent." He understood strategy, the US didn't in Viet Nam and didn't, at least until now, when it is probably too late in Iraq. To wit, winning the battle or the war is not totally important strategically (albeit a necessary tactical step) but winning the people is the goal. We lost the people by our tactics both politically and militarily in Phase IV Iraq.

Some quotes:

"That summer (2002) many generals had 3 major concerns about invading Iraq: the possibility of Saddam's using WMDs, the danger of becoming enmeshed in urban warfare, and the worry that a postwar occupation could be costly, especially if the US had to put in thousands of troops to hold the country together. "I can't tell you how many senior officers said to me, 'What in hell are we doing?' " recalled Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, who had been the J-3, or director of operations on the Joint Staff, since Oct 2000.........."They just didn't understand,: he recalled, " 'Why Iraq? Why now?'" They were especially worried about undercutting the offensive against Al Qaeda. "All of understood the fight was against the terrorists, and we were willing to do anything in that regard--so, "Why are we diverting assets and attention?' "

(note by reviewer, Newbold was one of the few who had the integrity to resign over Iraq)

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Rep Ike Skelton (D Missouri)....."who that afternoon (9/2/2002) wrote and sent to Bush a letter laying out his questions about the costs and duration of a US occupation of Iraq.....he quoted Clausewitz, to remind the White House of the requirement in war "not to take the first step without considering the last." He also invoked the other great philosopher of strategy, Sun Tzu, who had observed, "To win the victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult."

The official Bush administration line later would become that no one really foresaw the difficulties of postwar Iraq. But Skelton was pointing out the direction, as were a host of experts on the Middle East and some strategic thinkers inside the Army."

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(in late 2003) "In some quiet but significant ways, the Army was moving into intellectual opposition to the Bush administration. The Army War College, the service's premier educational institution, became a leading center of dissent during the occupation period with its analysts issuing scathing reviews. Containment of Iraq had worked, while the Bush administration's approach hadn't, argued a study written by Jeffery Record and published by the War College's Strategic Studies Institute (in 12/2003)."

As a student of history and political science (Georgetown SFS '82 and Wisconsin MA-History), I find it difficult to even begin calculating the long-term consequences of the decision to go to war in Iraq, particularly the manner in which we did. I wonder if even my children will see the damage to US foreign policy and national security repaired. "Fiasco" is the best summary of the entire endeavor I can think of!

quote:

Originally posted by wihntr:
As a student of history and political science (Georgetown SFS '82 and Wisconsin MA-History), I find it difficult to even begin calculating the long-term consequences of the decision to go to war in Iraq, particularly the manner in which we did. I wonder if even my children will see the damage to US foreign policy and national security repaired. "Fiasco" is the best summary of the entire endeavor I can think of!

When did you serve in our military,what have you done to preserve and protect your rights to express yourself?Lets hope the islamic terrorists are soundly defeated so they don't bring their jihad to our shores and cleanse the country of infidels ,like you and everyone else.